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Lex alterius: Using Law to Construct Confessional 
Boundaries 
 
 
John TOLAN 
 
 
 
Historiens et anthropologues doivent faire face à un problème méthodologique de taille, sans 
solution évidente : les outils conceptuels que nous employons pour essayer de comprendre des faits 
sociaux et culturels sont eux‐mêmes les produits, souvent, des sociétés que nous tentons d’analyser.  
C’est le cas, par exemple de la religion.  Daniel Boyarin (2004) affirme que le concept même de 
« religion » est un produit des IVe et Ve siècles, lors qu’évêques et empereurs érigèrent le 
christianisme en « religion » (la vraie religion pour eux, bien entendu) et construisirent le 
« judaïsme » et « l’hellénisme » (ce que nous appelons le paganisme) comme « fausses » religions.  
Pour Boyarin, le judaïsme ne devient religion qu’à partir du moment que les autorités chrétiennes 
impériales le définissent en tant que telle.  On pourrait dire de même pour l’agglomérat de textes, 
croyances et rituels que les Britanniques, en arrivant en Inde, rassemblèrent sur l’appellation de 
« l’hindouisme », qu’ils définirent comme une religion.  Bâtir, définir et policer des frontières entre 
groups confessionnels a été (et l’est toujours) un moyen important pour construire des identités, ou 
« visions de communautés » en maintes sociétés, surtout celles dont les dirigeants s’associent au 
christianisme ou à l’islam, et ce depuis les règnes des premiers empereurs romains chrétiens.  Que 
fallait‐il faire ou croire pour être considéré membre de la communauté confessionnelle dirigeante ?  
Quelles étaient les doctrines, affiliations institutionnelles, ou performances rituelles dont il fallait 
faire montre ?  Comment définissaient d’autres groups religieux ?  Quelle en était leur légitimité 
sociale ?  Que faire de ceux qui ne semblaient appartenir à aucun groupe reconnu légitime, qu’on 
définissait comme hérétiques ou syncrétistes ?  Dans cet article, j’étudie les manières dont les 
juristes chrétiens et musulmans du IVe au XIe siècles employèrent la loi pour définir et policer les 
frontières entre groups confessionnels, en particulier comment ils tentèrent de limiter les 
interactions qui risquaient de transgresser ces frontières : la commensalité, la sexualité 
interconfessionnelle et les pratiques syncrétiques. 
 
Historians and anthropologists are confronted with a persistent problem for which there is no clear 
solution: the conceptual tools which we use to attempt to understand cultures are themselves 
products of (often) the very cultures we are attempting to understand.  Take “religion”.  Daniel 
Boyarin (2004) has argued that the very concept of “religion” as we know it was a product of the 
fourth and fifth centuries, as bishops and emperors constructed Christianity as a religion (the true 
one, of course), and in counterdistinction constructed “Judaism” and “Hellenism” (or paganism) as 
“false” religions.  For Boyarin, Judaism only becomes a “religion” when Christian authorities define 
it as one.  The same could be said for the jumble of texts, beliefs and rituals that the English, upon 
arriving in India, lump together under the name “Hinduism”, which they turn into a religion. 
Building, defining and policing borders between confessional groups has been an important part of 
constructing identities—or visions of community—in various societies, in particular those ruled by 
Christians or Muslims, from the time of the fourth‐century Christian Roman emperors.  What did 
one have to do to be considered belonging to the “true” or dominant religious community: what 
doctrines, institutional affiliations, or ritual performances were necessary?  How were other 
religions defined as separate and legitimate?  What to do with those who seemed to fit in no 
category of accepted religion: the realm of syncretists and heretics? In this article, I examine how 
Christian and Muslim jurists of the fourth to eleventh centuries use law to define and police 
confessional boundaries, in particular how they attempt to limit interactions that could transgress 
or blur those boundaries: shared meals, sexual contact, syncretic practices.   
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* * *  
Lex alterius: Using Law to Construct Confessional Boundaries
1
 
John Tolan 
 
What is ‘community’? The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen a salutary scepticism 
concerning the conceptual categories of the 19th century, whether they involve scientific 
(biological/genetic) attempts to divide humanity into ‘races’ or social-scientific 
categorizations into ‘ethnicities’ or ‘tribes’. Such labels indeed need to be handled with 
caution, yet at times, in order to avoid their drawbacks, scholars substitute imprecise and 
unhelpful terms: ‘group’ and ‘community’ have both the merits and the pitfalls of their 
broadness and vagueness. As Andre Gingrich notes in these pages (concerning Yemen), 
‘substituting a very general, non-descriptive and formal term (community) for an indigenous 
term (qabila) and its partially problematic translation (tribe) is not a good solution, but is 
deeply problematic in itself.’ The historian and the anthropologist are constantly confronted 
with the question of the appropriateness of their conceptual categories for understanding 
societies distant in space and time.  Our own concepts (here, ‘tribe’) need to be defined (and 
their implications fleshed out) and compared with roughly equivalent terms in the society 
studied (here, qabila), always of course bearing in mind that these terms can have multiple 
meanings and may evolve over time.i 
In the following pages, I would like to look at the evolution of two key concepts, ‘law’ and 
‘religion’, and in particular at how law is used to define, identify, structure and enforce 
boundaries between religious groups. My time frame is the 5th to 12th centuries, a key 
formative period for the religious and legal systems of Christian and Islamic societies around 
the Mediterranean basin. I will in particular be looking at how law distinguishes between 
                                                        
1 The research leading to this publication has received funding from the European Research Council under the 
European Union's Seventh Framework Progamme (FP7/2007-2013) /ERC grant agreement n°249416. 
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groups which it identifies as Jews, Christians and Muslims. Here again, historians like 
anthropologists are confronted by problems of terminology: to what extent is it useful to use 
our own categories (law, religion) on societies distant (in time, space) from our own? The 
danger lies in assuming that these categories apply to recognizable phenomena that one finds 
in all cultures. 
We will need to pay close attention to terms used by the sources and how those terms evolve 
over time. The appropriate languages for our period and geographical area are numerous, and 
could potentially include Syriac, Greek, Hebrew, Coptic etc. To keep things (relatively) 
simple, I am going to focus on terms in Latin and in Arabic. In the lexical field of law, we 
will have to look at the meanings of Latin terms such as ius and lex, and Arabic terms such as 
sharī’a and fiqh. In addition we will be paying attention to terms used to describe texts 
concerning laws and their application and interpretation as well as terms designating those 
who practice law or implement or enforce law. For ‘religion’ we will be looking at Latin 
terms such as religio, superstitio, fides, cultus and the Arabic terms dīn and sharī’a. Over the 
eight centuries that concern us, moreover, the meanings of these terms evolve, in some cases 
changing radically depending on period, context and individual author. What’s more, while 
‘religion’ and ‘law’ are clearly separate categories in 21st-century English, in Medieval Latin 
and Arabic they overlapped in crucial ways.  
I want to look at how these concepts shift and at how religious boundaries are defined and 
policed through legal texts during four watershed periods in legal history: 1. The emergence 
of ‘religion’ as a key element of personal law in the Christian Roman Empire (4th–6th 
centuries); 2. Religious identity and judicial pluralism in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle 
Ages (5th—7th centuries); 3. The expansion of Islam and the creation of a protected and 
subordinate dhimmī  status; 4. The ‘rediscovery’ of Roman law and the refoundation of canon 
law (11th—12th centuries). 
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1. The emergence of ‘religion’ as a key element of personal law in the Christian Roman 
Empire (4th–6th centuries) 
Ancient Latin has two principal terms that may be translated in English as ‘law’: lex and ius. 
Etymologically, it seems that both come from verbs that mean to bind or attach (jungere, 
ligere), suggesting the binding nature of law. But ius is much broader than lex. For Cicero, ius 
civile consists of lex, mos (custom) and equitas (fairness).ii In other words the lex, as written 
and transmitted by Roman authorities, was only one of the sources of ius. As Alain Supiot has 
pointed out, while English has one term, law, to render both Latin notions, most European 
languages have distinct terms for ius (droit, derecho, diritto, Recht) and for lex (loi, ley, legge, 
Gesetz). (Supiot, 2005: 27–29, 85–86; Magdelain, 1990, Schiavone, 2005: ch. 1 & 4) A 
European jurist studies droit (or derecho, diritto, Recht), to which he then will devote his 
career; knowledge concerning the laws (lois, leyes etc.) enacted by various governments are 
only one aspect of his study.  This apparent linguistic accident corresponds to a difference of 
legal culture and legal practice. Anglo-American law is based more on common law notions 
and on legal precedent (with an accusatory legal system based on opposing parties of 
accusation and defence with a neutral judge and jury). Continental law is based more on the 
traditions of Roman law enshrined in written codes (with an inquisitorial legal system in 
which the judge takes an active role in the investigation of the allegations). Hence we see that 
even within 20th or 21st century European traditions, an Anglophone scholar may come up 
against unexpected cultural barriers when he tries to understand the place of ‘law’ in other 
cultures: these barriers are of course more imposing as one looks at cultures more distant in 
space and time, often raising the question of the legitimacy (or relevance) of the chosen 
categories. 
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What about religion? The Latin term religio comes from the same root as lex: ligere, to bind.  
Service to the gods is also ‘binding’. Religio refers both to an attitude of reverence, respect 
and fear of the gods and to the devotion shown towards them. The term is almost never used 
in the plural in classical Latin: religio is a general attitude and behaviour that can be adopted 
toward one or many gods. While each god/goddess has his/her own specific cult and rituals, 
in no sense do these amount to different ‘religions’. Hence an ancient Roman would not 
understand the question ‘what religion are you?’. (Bendlin, 1995) Religion in the ancient 
Mediterranean was often (though by no means always) associated with civic governance. 
Thus for an Athenian, the festivals associated with Athena were civic, political and religious 
events of major importance: these different elements were inextricable. For Romans, the same 
is true for the cult of Vesta or Capitoline Jupiter—and, later, for the cult of the deified 
emperors. Refusal to participate would indicate lack of civic duty as well as religious duty. 
Jews were early granted exemptions from taking part in traditional Roman cults, but these 
privileges were granted to Jews as a people or ethnos, not a ‘religion’. The Romans had many 
accords with different nations (gentes or ethnoi), recognizing their rights to maintain 
traditional social, legal and at times cultic practices. Roman accords with the Jews were thus 
nothing exceptional, even if certain stipulations were unique to the Jews (not bringing 
imperial insignia into the city of Jerusalem, exempting Jews from participating in cults of 
Roman deities, not summoning them to court on the Sabbath, etc.). (Pucci Ben Zeev, 1995) 
The concept of religion as we know it is in many ways a product of the 4th and 5th century 
Christian Roman Empire.  The Christian movement was born as a faction within Judaism and, 
starting principally at the time of Paul, proselytized among non-Jews, who eventually make 
up the majority of Christians. A diffuse, geographically dispersed, eclectic and disorganized 
movement, facing sporadic (and at times intense) persecution from Roman officials. In the 1st 
century, bishops emerged as the leaders of Christian communities of the Empire’s cities, but 
their modes of election and scope of authority varied widely. Among those who identified 
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themselves as Christians, there was no firmly established doctrine, and there were widely 
diverging attitudes concerning (among other things) Jewish cultic practices, the observance of 
Jewish holidays, frequenting of synagogues, Hellenic philosophy and the authority of the 
Roman state. 
It is the edict of Milan of 313 and the favour shown to Christians by Constantine that 
permitted the development of the Church as an institution and the establishment of 
commonly-agreed doctrines.  In 325, Constantine called the council of Nicaea, the First 
Ecumenical Council of the Church, which established the credo (or Nicene Creed): the basic 
statement of faith to which every Christian is supposed to adhere. It also established the 
primacy of four bishops, those of Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch and Rome (Constantinople 
would later be added to the list), who in theory exercised authority over lesser bishops. 
Arguably, Nicaea represents the invention of Christianity as the first ‘religion’ in the modern, 
commonly-accepted sense of the term: a ‘faith’ to which its members must adhere (the Creed) 
and a ‘Church’ structured along hierarchical lines. There was never a ‘credo’ defining what 
Jews had to believe, nor of course was there ever one for the adepts of Jupiter, Athena or Isis. 
And while many cults (including that of the Jews) had priestly castes closely allied to political 
power, the structure of the new Christian church was meant to be more far-reaching and 
universal. It was of course one thing for emperor and bishops to agree to a creed and to their 
own authority over the emerging Christian Church, quite another to impose this idea on 
Christians throughout the empire.  Under Constantine the bishops emerged as new important 
players in the politics of the Empire, in many ways obtaining the privileges and influence 
formerly held by the senatorial class. (Drake, 2000)  
If in the 4th century Christianity became the first ‘religion’, it was to inspire imitators. Julian the 
Apostate ruled the empire from 355 to 360 and sought to restore the traditional pagan practices of the 
Empire, authorizing sacrifices and other cultic practices that his predecessors had outlawed, restoring 
and reopening temples, or reconverting those that had been made into churches. Julian sought to 
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revive the traditional cults, yet as Susanna Elm has shown, his conceptions were deeply coloured by 
the struggle with Christianity: Julian invented paganism (or ‘Hellenism’ as he called it) as a religion, 
endowing it with a creed and a coherency that traditional Roman cultic practices had never known. 
(Elm, 2012) 
While Julian’s restoration of ‘Hellenism’ as a state religion was short-lived, another ‘religion’ 
was to become defined over and against Christianity: Judaism. Daniel Boyarin speaks of a 
process of ‘Christian invention of Judaism’ in the 4th and 5th centuries, as Christian writers 
define orthodoxy over and against those outside that orthodoxy: Jews, ‘Hellenes’ and heretics. 
The Roman state plays a key role in the institutionalization of the Christian church, as we see 
notably through the Theodosian Code, promulgated in 438 by Theodosius II, which brings 
together laws of Christian emperors from Constantine I to Theodosius II.  These laws 
characterize Judaism as a ‘sect’ (secta CTh 16.8.2, 8.8, 8.9), sometimes adding for good 
measure qualifiers such as ‘beastly’ or ‘nefarious’ (feralem sectam 16.8.1; nefariam sectam 
16.8.1). At other times laws refer to Jewish ‘perversity’ or ‘incredulity’ (perversitatem 
iudaicam 16.8.19; incredulitate judaica 16.8.19). In other places the term ‘superstition’ is 
used (Iudaica superstitione 16.8.24; tenebris superstitionis 16.8.28). Here superstitio, like 
religio, has taken on a new meaning: superstitio is the opposite of religio, it is false religio. 
(Le Code Théodosien: Livre Xvi Livre Xvi, 2005; Boyarin, 2004) 
Yet other laws present Judaism as a religio alongside Christianity. Various laws decree 
protection of synagogues, respect for the Sabbath (Jews may not be summoned to court on a 
Saturday), etc.. (Nemo-Pekelman, 2010) Moreover, a hierarchy of Jewish officials was 
recognized and given, quite explicitly, the same privileges as the high officials of the 
Christian church, creating what Amnon Linder has called a ‘Jewish Church’. (Linder, 2006: 
157) In other words, imperial officials and bishops recognized ‘Judaism’ as a religion at the 
same time that they sought to keep it distinct and separate from Christianity and the Christian 
Church. At the same time, a rabbinical elite that had succeeded in obtaining social and 
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intellectual dominance within the Jewish community not only accepted these developments, 
but actively embraced them. In other words, emerging Jewish and Christian religious elites 
defined the new Jewish and Christian ‘religions’ and ‘churches’ and strove to erect a firm and 
watertight barrier between the two. (Boyarin, 2004) 
It has often been posited that legal restrictions on Jews are driven by theological 
considerations. This is the classic thesis of Jean Juster, who saw in the anti-Jewish legislation 
of the Theodosian code the fruits of Church pressure on the Christian Roman Emperors. A so-
called ‘Augustinian doctrine’ of Judaism relegated Jews to a protected but subordinated social 
and legal status. In various works, Augustine addresses the role of Jews in Christian society. 
(Signer, 1999; Fredriksen, 2008) In the City of God (XVIII:46), he explains that the Jews who 
put Jesus to death and failed to believe in him were in consequence crushed by the Romans 
and sent into exile among the nations. Since they are found everywhere, they serve as 
witnesses, ‘living letters of the law’: proof in the flesh both of the truth of the scriptures 
which they preserve in the original Hebrew and of the humiliation meted out by Christ to 
those of his people who refuse to recognize Him as their Lord. (Cohen, 1999) While Christian 
heretics (such as the Donatists) should be compelled to conform to the Catholic faith, Jews 
should be allowed to live in peace among Christians. They preserve in error the ancient 
covenant and through their error, and their subservient place in Christian society, serve as 
unwitting witnesses to the superior truth of Christianity. Moreover, the Jews will, of their own 
will, massively convert to Christianity at the end of time: this, indeed, will be one of the signs 
that the end is near. For Jean Juster, the 4th- and 5th-century emperors translated this 
theological vision into a legal programme, creating a protected and inferior legal and social 
status for Jews in a now Christian Roman Empire. Yet in fact, as Capucine Nemo-Pekelman 
has shown, these Christian emperors are in no way establishing a coherent, theologically 
centred Jewry law: rather their laws are more often than not reacting to specific situations at 
the request of various individuals—sometimes bishops or imperial officials, sometimes Jews. 
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(Juster, 1914; Nemo-Pekelman, 2010) When the jurists working for Theodosius II codify 
these laws, they do indeed group most of them together in a chapter devoted primarily to 
Jews, showing an attempt to lay the groundwork for specific restrictions concerning Jews. If 
anything, it is the theologians, such as Augustine, who are responding to social and legal 
realities and not the other way around: confronted with Emperors who issued legal guarantees 
to Jews, they found theological justifications for a social status quo that they had not chosen, 
that explained why Christians allowed Jews to live in their midst. 
At the same time as bishops and other men of the Church drew sharp distinctions between 
Christians and Jews, they attempted to affirm their authority over Christians and to brand 
deviant Christians as ‘heretics’. The definition of orthodoxy and suppression of heresy thus 
became major preoccupations of bishops, Church councils and, to a certain extent, emperors. 
While historians of the Church, dependent on the narratives of Eusebius and his followers, 
stress the doctrinal nature of these disputes, Harold Drake and others have rightly emphasized 
the importance of personal and political dimensions of these disputes: as important as (or 
often more important than) what is defined as orthodoxy is who has the authority to define 
and enforce orthodoxy and what coercive measures are to be taken against those who do not 
recognize that authority.  Constantine and his successors exile recalcitrant bishops; at times, 
more violent methods were employed—notably the use of imperial troops against Donatists in 
North Africa. (Drake, 2000)  
Yet councils, patriarchs and emperors were never successful in imposing unity on the Church. 
On the contrary, a plurality of churches emerged alongside the Church officially recognized 
by the emperors: churches of Arians, Miaphysites (also known as Monophysites), and other 
dissenters from Chalcedonian orthodoxy. These churches had their own legal-institutional 
hierarchies (with their own bishops and priests) and eventually their own distinct liturgical 
languages (Armenian, Coptic, Syriac, etc.). 
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To sum up, the Christian concept of ‘religion’ was born in the struggles with rival traditions. 
Christianity comprised the first ‘church’ and first ‘religion’ and subsequently both Christian 
and non-Christian authors defined Hellenism and Judaism as rival ‘religions’. This 
background knowledge is essential not only for historians of ancient and medieval Judaism 
and Christianity, but for all those (historians, anthropologists, sociologists and others) who 
work on ‘religion’. Since the 5th century, ‘religion’ implies a unified doctrine or credo and 
often a hieratically organized church with a professional clergy. Our everyday concept of 
religion is inextricably wound up with the history of Christianity, which explains why it is 
often an awkward or inappropriate tool for understanding other societies: witness the frequent 
scholarly debates on whether Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism etc. are or are not 
‘religions’. 
 
2. Religious identity and judicial pluralism in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages 
(5th—7th centuries) 
One of the pitfalls of much 19th- and 20th-century legal scholarship, as anthropologist 
Leopold Pospíšil noted in 1971, is to assume that any given society operates under one legal 
system, when in fact multiple systems of regulation and conflict resolution often coexist in the 
same society. (Pospisil, 1971: 99–106) Pospíšil attributes this common error to a Western 
prejudice based on Roman law, which claimed to emanate from a sole legitimate authority 
and to apply to the whole empire. But in fact the Roman Empire also knew considerable 
judicial pluralism. In theory, we can distinguish between legal pluralism (more than one law 
system having authority in the same territory) and multiple jurisdictions (more than one venue 
for judgement).iii Legal pluralism was a constant in the Roman system, as Romans granted 
privileges to different gentes who incorporated the empire; such pluralism tended to diminish, 
at least in theory, with the widespread accordance of Roman citizenship. At the same time, in 
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particular between the 4th and 7th centuries, jurisdictions multiply, as alternate venues for 
adjudication emerge and gain importance. In Christian Rome/Byzantium, access to the 
‘official’ Roman justice system was costly and bureaucratic, and was usually an option in 
major criminal cases and in cases in which wealthy and powerful individuals felt they could 
benefit from the system. With reduced fees for the elite, and judges taken from the Roman 
elite, the system carried a clear social bias and many complained of corruption. Fees for 
getting a court hearing could be roughly the equivalent of costs of feeding someone for a year. 
So naturally plaintiffs sought alternate venues for dispute resolution. These included 
episcopal courts (bishops wielded spiritual authority and from the time of Constantine were 
recognized as civil magistrates), the more or less informal courts of local lay magnates, and 
holy men (notably stylite monks). In many cases, both litigants would agree to submit to the 
arbitration of a lay or clerical arbitrator, thus avoiding the official state court system. 
(Simonsohn, 2011) Religious affiliation was an important factor in determining under whose 
authority any individual was, but it was a network of fluid and overlapping jurisdictions, in 
which individuals often had the opportunity to exercise choice (what legal scholars call 
‘forum shopping’). 
Religious affiliation was of course not the only factor determining legal status of an 
individual. This is particularly true in Latin Europe in the 5th to 8th centuries, as new 
kingdoms emerged in what had been the western empire, and as their kings issued (or had 
written) a series of law codes in which law and jurisdiction depended less on territorial limits 
of any kingdom and more on the legally or ethnically defined status of individuals as 
‘Romans’, ‘Goths’, ‘Franks’ etc.. (Berman,1983: 49–68) Which law applied to any individual 
and how it applied depended not (or not only) in which territory one lived but on a variety of 
social factors: free or unfree, lay or cleric, Roman or Frank. In the Salic Law, for example, the 
wergild (compensation) for killing a man depends on the status of the victim: 100 shillings for 
killing a Roman; 200 for a free Frank, a ‘Barbarian living under Salic Law’ or a woman too 
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old to bear children; 300 for a Roman who ‘eats at the king’s palace’; 600 for a young boy, a 
woman of child-bearing age, a count, or a man in the king’s service; 700 for a pregnant 
woman. (Fischer Drew, 1991) 
Much ink has been spilt over how to interpret such laws. While often the kings who were at 
the origin of these codes claimed to be recording the ancestral laws of their gentes, we in fact 
find a mixture of Roman and Germanic elements in many of these codes. What was the 
purpose (or the purposes) of having them written down? To reconcile competing or 
overlapping systems of justice, Roman and ‘barbarian’? To give prestige to the gens and its 
king, now in possession of their own written law? To diffuse or discourage traditional forms 
of private or clan justice (through vengeance and vendetta), by replacing them with tariffed 
menus of wergild? To offer protection to those (in particular churchmen) who did not benefit 
from family and clan solidarity and who thus may have been more vulnerable to violence? No 
doubt each of these motivations was behind one or another of these compilations. But it is 
difficult to know to what extent they were used or applied in practice. 
In a legal culture in which social, ethnic, political and economic factors affected the legal 
status of individuals, religious affiliation was one discriminating factor among many. With 
the notable exception of laws concerning Jews in Visigothic Spain, these codes say little or 
nothing about religiously defined groups. For the Early Middle Ages the principal source of 
laws discriminating along religious lines are the canons issued by church councils, which in 
many cases reiterate earlier Roman law (such as the stipulations of the Theodosian Code). For 
example, the prohibition of intermarriage between Christians and Jews, promulgated in the 
Theodosian Code (CTh 3.7.2), is reiterated by the councils of Orleans 2 (in 533), Claremont 1 
(535) and Orleans 3 (538). Various laws in the Theodosian Code had prohibited Jews from 
circumcising their Christian slaves: the third council of Orleans reiterates this prohibition and 
extends it more generally to the mistreatment of Christian slaves; the fourth council of Toledo 
(633) prohibits Jews outright from owning Christian slaves, a prohibition which would be 
RELMIN “The Legal Status of Religious Minorities in the Euro-Mediterranean World (5th – 15th centuries)” 
 13 
adopted into Gratian’s Decretum in the 12th century.iv Here again, these conciliar canons pose 
problems of interpretation, as we have little evidence of the extent to which they were 
respected. For example, does the reiteration of the prohibition of marriage between Christians 
and Jews at three councils in the 530s imply that such marriage was taking place and that 
successive councils were unsuccessful in stopping the practice? Or is it merely an instance of 
one council adopting a measure from an earlier one, whether or not it corresponded to real 
practice? Similarly, repeated laws against Jews owning Christian slaves may say more about 
the zeal of the Christian legislators than about social realities. At some of these councils, only 
ecclesiastics (in particular bishops) were present; in others, kings took an active role. To what 
extent does this imply royal sanction for the canons of these councils?   
In sum, in a period for which there are few sources concerning the functioning of justice and 
the place of non-Christians (in particular Jews) in the Latin Europe, the collections of laws, 
whether royal or conciliar, are among the most important and abundant sources. Yet the 
sources are difficult to interpret and have given rise to widely divergent readings concerning 
the place of Jews in the legal systems (and more broadly in the societies) of Latin 
Christendom.v In the absence of Hebrew sources, we know nothing about whether or to what 
extent Jewish communities enjoyed judicial autonomy within the new polities of the Latin 
west; the laws say little about Jews’ access to justice. 
 
3. The expansion of Islam and the creation of a protected and subordinate dhimmī  
status 
The arrival of Islam added another jurisdictional layer to the legal pluralism that 
Mediterranean and Near-Eastern societies had known under Romano-Byzantine and Persian 
rule. In the wake of the Muslim conquests, the official Roman justice system ceased to exist 
in the conquered areas. This tended to enforce the role of bishops as judges for disputes (both 
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civil and religious) between Christians. Yet there were other, competing authorities, both 
Christian and non-Christian, lay and ecclesiastical.  Christians could decide to take their cases 
to a local prominent Christian layman, to a monastery, to a stylite hermit. Or they could take 
their litigation to a Muslim qāḍī. We know about all this principally from the texts in which 
episcopal authorities (bishops or those speaking for the bishops) complain of these practices 
or try to prohibit them. We have similar testimonies concerning Jews. Already in the late 
Roman periods, we find texts in which the Jewish patriarch attempts to prohibit Jews from 
taking their cases to Roman courts. In similar ways, various medieval responsa prohibit Jews 
from approaching Muslim judges. The more shrill these proclamations, and the more 
draconian the punishments for them (excommunication in some cases), the clearer it is that 
these restrictions are little respected. (Simonsohn, 2011) 
While Muslim administrators and jurists incorporated and adapted legal traditions from their 
predecessors, notably the Persian and Byzantine empires, the corpus of Persian or Roman law 
was never seen as legitimate in and of itself and very little of it was ever translated into 
Arabic (in contrast with the massive translation of scientific and philosophical works during 
the ’Umayyad and especially the Abbasid dynasty). The backbone of Muslim law was the 
sharī‘a, literally ‘the path’ or the sunna (tradition), based on God’s word (the Qur’ān) and the 
sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (as transmitted in the hadith). Scripture and law 
are inextricably linked for Muslims as for Jews and Christians: Muslim writers often refer to 
Judaism and Christianity (or their scriptures) as Ahl al-Kitab (people of the book), and also to 
sharī’a Musa (the way of Moses) and sharī’a al-Masīh (the way of the Messiah), and Jewish 
and Christian authors themselves at times refer to their own scriptures as sharī’a. (Hooker, 
M., ‘Shari’a’, EI2 9:331–38) While there was only one God and hence one dīn, there were 
many ‘paths’ (sharī‘a-s) towards him, as the Qur’ān affirms. (Quran 5;48)vi 
During the 7th and 8th centuries, the study of law, fiqh, emerged in the new urban centres of 
the Islamic empire, based on the Qur’ān, hadith, and also the collected opinions (ra’y) of 
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legal scholars—the latter, of course, often informed by pre-Islamic (notably Persian and 
Byzantine) concepts of law and justice.vii Yet in the early 9th century, one prominent jurist, 
al-Shāfi’ī (d. 820, founder of the eponymous Shāfi’ī school, one of the four madhhabs of 
classical Sunni Islam), declared that ra’y, the mere opinion of a jurist (however eminent) was 
insufficient as a basis for law, which had to be built on the pillars of Qur’ān and hadith. This 
point of view—also directed against Shi‘ite tendencies to attribute less significance to the 
Sunna in favour of Imams’ rulings—became dominant in the east. It led to a flurry of activity 
among jurists who needed to find (or invent) hadith to justify their legal opinions. (Fierro, 
1991: 119–132) In the Muslim west, however (the Maghreb and Muslim Spain), the ‘people 
of the hadith” (ahl al-hadith) did not prevail over those of opinion (ahl al-ra’y): the legal 
opinions of Malik, founder of the Malikite madhhab, laid out in his Mutawwana, formed the 
basis of later reflection by jurists, and the disciplines of fiqh and hadith remained largely 
distinct and separate, unlike in the Orient. 
Fiqh developed a clearly-defined status for Jews, Christians and at times other non-Muslims 
as dhimmī-s, or protected persons.viii Although the Qur’ān does not clearly establish the legal 
framework for non-Muslims within the dār al-islām, it declares that the Muslim must not 
force the ‘peoples of the book’ (ahl al-kitāb, the Jews and Christians) to convert. By contrast, 
he may oblige them to recognize the superiority and suzerainty of Muslim authority and to 
pay ‘humbly’ the jizya, the capitulation tax. (Qur’ān 9:29) During the conquests of the first 
Islamic centuries, the victorious Muslims gave guarantees to the conquered peoples, granting 
them legal autonomy and freedom of worship. According to certain chroniclers, restrictions 
were sometimes among the conditions of surrender applied to the defeated Christians. This is 
apparent in the Pact of ’Umar, which, according to Muslim tradition, the second caliph, 
’Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644), imposed on the Christians of Syria. In fact these restrictions 
were imposed gradually, throughout the first Muslim century, and expanded under ’Umar II 
(717–720). (Fattal, 1995: 60–69; Oulddali, 2012) The first author to give us a full version of 
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the Pact of ’Umar is the Andalusian traditionist al-Turtūshī (d. 1126) in his Siraj al-mulūk. In 
that text, the Christians of Syria send a missive to Caliph ’Umar to remind him of the pledge 
they made at the time of their surrender. They present a long list of prohibitions that they 
agreed to respect: on building new churches and monasteries, teaching the Qur’ān, wearing 
‘Muslim’ clothing or turbans, bearing arms, and so on. A numbers of these measures were 
aimed at limiting or proscribing the public expression of Christianity. Hence the Christians 
pledged not to put crosses on their churches, not to display their scriptures in public, not to 
participate in certain public processions, not to pray in a noisy or ostentatious manner, not to 
ring their bells too loudly. (Fattal,1995: 62) 
Tradition attributed that pact to ’Umar, general during the conquests and the second caliph, 
probably to grant authority to a status that took definite shape only slowly in the early Muslim 
centuries. It was during the 8th and 9th centuries CE that the Umayyad, then the Abbasid, 
caliphs and jurists defined and circumscribed the status of the dhimmī. By paying the jizya, 
the dhimmī-s marked their submission to Muslim authority and as a result enjoyed its 
protection. Land owners also paid the kharāj, a property tax higher than the one Muslims had 
to pay. Dhimmī men could not marry Muslim women, though Muslim men could marry 
Jewish or Christian women. The theoretical restrictions were not uniformly respected, 
however. Far from it: many churches and synagogues were built in Muslim countries; the 
clothing prohibitions were applied very unevenly, and a number of Christians and Jews 
occupied positions of authority in the entourage of princes. Yet in fact when one looks closely 
at the early legal texts or chronicles from both the Mashrek and the Maghreb, there is little 
evidence for a standard, uniform dhimmī system, but rather a wide variety of local 
adaptations, as recent scholarship has shown.  Even for the jizya, often presented as the 
linchpin of this system, there are significant variations.  The classic jizya model (to the extent 
one ever existed) was in fact a product of the Abbasids: in the Umayyad period, fiscal policy 
towards conquered Christians was quite varied and often based on practical considerations 
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and respect for local traditions. The jizya could at times be imposed on individuals but also on 
groups; sometimes it was levied on lands (blurring the distinction between jizya and kharaj). 
(Carmona, 2013) The jizya was not systematically levied either in 7th-century Egypt or in 
9th-century Sicily. (Nef, 2013) 15th-century Tlemcen mufti Qāsim al-’Uqbānī was asked 
whether the jizya is to be imposed on all Jews or only those who live in the cities; as one 
might expect, he affirmed the principle that it applied to all male Jews who lived as dhimmīs 
under the protection of Muslim rulers: but the very fact that the question was raised suggests 
that rural Jews were often in practice exempted from paying. (Voguet, 2013) 
Dhimmī communities enjoyed a certain juridical autonomy: bishops or other Christian 
officials judged cases between Christians and the same applied to Jews; only cases involving 
a Muslim would in theory be brought to a Muslim court.  Yet in Egypt, qāḍī Khayr bin 
Nu’aym (751-53) judged cases between dhimmīs—and accepted their testimony, after having 
verified with their fellow Jews or Christians that they were trustworthy; one of his successors, 
Muhammad bin Masrūq al-Kindi (qāḍī from 793 to 800), received Christians in the main 
mosque of Cairo to hear their cases. (Kindi, 2012: 41, 108, 156) Other jurists sought to 
safeguard dhimmīs judicial autonomy:  Ifriqiyan jurist Abu Muhammad Abdullah ibn Abi 
Zayd al-Qayrawani (922–996) posits that only if both Christian parties and their bishop agree 
to submit a case to a Muslim qāḍī should the latter hear the case (which otherwise is under the 
jurisdiction of the bishop).ix Shafi i͑te jurist al-Māwardī (from Basra, d. 1058), for example, 
recommends not intervening in the internal affairs of dhimmīs, who, he affirms, have the right 
to settle their intra-communal conflicts under their own jurisdictions, which function 
independently. If, however, they decide to approach a Muslim tribunal or solicit the 
arbitration of a qāḍī, they cannot be prevented from doing so. The qāḍī may hear the case on 
the condition that he renders a judgement according to Islamic law; in this case the penalties 
provided by Islamic law, including corporal punishment, will also be applied to them.x Other 
jurists similarly affirm that judicial autonomy should be respected, but that some cases may 
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be heard by Muslim qāḍīs. Malakite jurist Ibrāhīm Ibn ʿAbd al-Rafīʿ (d. 1332) upholds the 
same principle of the right of dhimmīs to settle internal disputes by means of their own laws. 
He affirms that Muslim justice should not encroach upon matters pertaining to dhimmī courts 
of justice since the autonomy of these courts is one of the guarantees accorded to non-
Muslims. Nevertheless, if the dhimmī plaintiffs refer the matter to the qāḍī, he has the option 
of accepting and settling their dispute on the condition that he does so with recourse to 
Muslim law. Yet the very fact that he insists that the qāḍī must apply Muslim laws suggests 
that in some cases dhimmīs may have expected Muslim officials to judge according to 
Christian or Jewish law.xi Clearly, some Jews and Christians preferred taking even their 
internal disputes to a Muslim qāḍī, and that for at least some of them in some cases, forum 
shopping was a real possibility. 
Between the 4th and 6th centuries, as we have seen, the concept of ‘religion’ as we know it 
emerged, and through the pronouncements of bishops, rabbis and theologians—and through 
the laws preserved in compilations such as the Theodosian Code and the texts of Justinian—
boundaries were erected between groups identified as ‘Christian’, ‘Jewish’ and ‘heretic’. By 
the time Islam emerged in the Arabian peninsula, boundaries between various Jewish and 
Christian confessional groups (though at times shifting) were established and known. Thus 
the Qur’ān recognizes Jews and Christians as distinct groups, both of which (as Ahl al-Kitab) 
have their own scripture; Muslim jurists developed the notion of dhimmī and defined their 
role in Muslim society.  While practices varied widely, in theory practitioners of fiqh from 
Baghdad to Cordoba recognized the judicial autonomy of dhimmī communities and limited 
the jurisdiction of Muslim qāḍīs over dhimmīs.xii This clear theory of subordination and 
autonomy contrasts with the somewhat confused picture of the Jewish position within Latin 
Christendom in the Early Middle Ages, as we have seen.  It is only with the renewed study of 
law in the 11th and 12th centuries that jurists attempt to define the place of Jews (and 
Muslims) in Christian society. 
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4. The ‘rediscovery’ of Roman law and the refoundation of canon law (11th—12th 
centuries) 
The 11th and 12th centuries, in Latin Europe, witnessed what many scholars have referred to 
as a ‘renaissance’ in the study of law. This movement, associated in particular with the 
schools of law in Bologna (which would emerge at the turn of the 13th century as Europe’s 
first university), involved the commentary of key texts of Roman law—in particular the code 
of Justinian. The elaboration of civil law was accompanied in Bologna by the codification and 
study of canon law. The two developed in parallel and to a certain extent in competition. At 
issue were the relations between ecclesiastical and lay power and authority and the definition 
of orthodoxy. This context is essential to the development of law in the period and four 
closely related issues need to be kept in mind: the struggle between Empire and Papacy (what 
is traditionally referred to as the ‘investiture controversy’), the birth of scholasticism, the 
emergence of a highly trained clerical elite (which came to dominate both ecclesiastical and 
lay administrations) and the birth and growth of heretical movements within Latin 
Christendom (and organized efforts to combat them). These developments, which together 
comprise what Harold Berman has called the ‘Papal Revolution’, transformed European 
conceptions of law and religion and of the relations between the two. (Le Bras et al., 1965) 
A consequence of the reform movement was a redefinition of the political legitimacy of 
monarchy. Until the 11th century, kings and emperors were portrayed as the anointed of God, 
holy, crowned by Christ, His agents on earth who knew no equal; their consecration (through 
the anointment that accompanied coronation ceremonies) placed them not only above the laity 
but also the churchmen. Yet starting in the 11th century, ecclesiastical reformers increasingly 
challenged this ideology, affirming that the Pope was the true ‘Vicar of Christ’. While kings 
and emperors never gave up entirely on the sacred nature of their power, they now sought 
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other sources of legitimacy, in particular in law: putting less of an emphasis on sacral 
kingship, they embraced legal monarchy, for which they (or their jurists) turned to the legal 
traditions of Rome, in particular the compilations made under Justinian. 
The renewal of Roman jurisprudence met the practical needs of a rapidly urbanizing society 
and bureaucracy. While it was supporters of the empire who first embraced Justinian’s work, 
interest quickly exceeded the context of disputes between papacy and empire. Bolognese 
lawyers tried to order society along rational and universal standards. Justinian himself had 
tried to coordinate and unify the Roman law; he affirms that there is no contradiction in his 
legal works. xiii This assertion made sense to 12th-century readers: like the Bible, Roman law 
brooked no contradiction, and the work of a legist (like that of a theologian) is to find clever 
explanations to show that any conflict is apparent, that the laws of Justinian (like the biblical 
doctrines) can be (to paraphrase Abelard) ‘diversa sed non adversa’, ‘different, but not 
adverse’.  
In a way, these lawyers were performing the work that Justinian himself had ordered to be 
done: to accept his laws and to enact and explain them, so that they may better govern the 
empire. Indeed, as Harold Berman has emphasized, it is the 12th- and 13th-century 
commentators on these texts who first conceived them as a unified ‘body’ and called them the 
Corpus iuris civilis. (Benson, 1982: 363; Berman, 1983) 12th-century jurists tried to explain 
the Justinian code by referring only to other Roman legal texts, straining to impose order 
these disparate texts, or rather (they would say) to discover and restore the underlying order. 
If the emperor is the supreme legislator, the source of law is not arbitrary authority: it is 
justice (aequitas), which the emperor puts into place and interprets, that is the source of law 
(ius); this justice (for many jurists) is identical to reason (ratio). Roman law is a rational order 
that should be restored. ‘For a civil and religious society in which different customs prevail 
… the Corpus provides a uniform, rational law’ (Winroth, 2002) 
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At the turn of the 12th century, the papacy and its advocates had no systematic opus of canon 
law to oppose to the Justinian corpus. Canon law was based on a broad and diverse collection 
of texts: papal bulls, canons of Church councils, writings of the Church fathers, and biblical 
injunctions. Several 11th- and 12th-century canonists (notably Burchard of Worms and Ivo of 
Chartres) had compiled some of these materials into thematically oriented collections.  But it 
was in Bologna in the 12th century that the most thorough and systematic attempt to forge a 
summum of canon law was undertaken: the Concordia discordantium canonum, better known 
as the Decretum. This work is traditionally attributed to Johannes Gratiani, or Gratian, about 
whom we know very little. Recent work, notably that of Anders Winroth, has shown that the 
Decretum was most probably a collaborative effort and that the text evolved over the course 
of several decades). In any case, the Decretum was an immense, thematically organized, 
encyclopaedic compilation of canon law that quickly became the manual of canon law, 
indispensable both for the church officials who applied canon law (and rendered judgments 
based on it) and for the masters who taught it, in Bologna and elsewhere.  
This fundamental transformation of canon law has long been recognized as a watershed in 
how Europeans conceived ‘religion’. For legal historian Rudolph Sohm, the ‘old Catholic’ 
church law (as seen in particular in the penitentials) was essentially spiritual and sacramental; 
only with Gratian did it become ‘legal’ in the modern sense. (Tolan, 2003; Berman, 1983: 
201–3) Similarly, for Arnold Angenendt the scholastic revolution in both law and theology 
was key factor in the transformation of European Christendom from an ‘archaic’ religion in 
the Early Middle Ages (based on formulaic ritual and closely associated with magic) to a 
more modern conception of religion (based on individual spirituality and reasoned theological 
inquiry). (Angenendt, 1997)xiv While both Sohm’s and Angenendt’s analyses have been 
contested and nuanced, they are no doubt correct in seeing the intellectual and textual 
revolution of the scholastic age as introducing a fundamentally new conception of religion. 
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While the canon law of Gratian could be seen in some ways as a defensive response to the 
development of pro-imperial Roman law traditions, in many respects the two movements 
shared the same goals: taming the dense thicket of laws, decrees, privileges and rules, turning 
it into an orderly garden, reflection of divine reason and of the power of his earthy agents, 
whether emperors and kings or popes. In many ways, of course, this was an intellectual game 
or a dream, far from the realities of law: these same emperors, kings and popes issued a 
bewildering variety of very specific laws and privileges to cities, dioceses etc. Yet jurists still 
dreamed of harmonizing law in accordance with rational principles and expressed their 
frustration with local or regional exceptions to the overarching schemes of Roman and canon 
law: the canonist Huguccio dubbed the Lex lombarda (Lombard Law) faex lombarda 
(Lombard shit). (Benson, 1982) 
 
How does Gratian present the relations between these different types of law and define 
hierarchies among them? In his Tractatus de legibus, he affirms:  
The Human Race is ruled by two things: namely, natural law (naturalis ius) and 
customs(mores). The law (ius) of nature is what is contained in the lex and the Gospel. 
By it, each person is commanded to do to others what he wants done to himself and is 
prohibited from inflicting on others what he does not want done to himself. As Christ 
says in the Gospel: ‘So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to 
you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets’. All laws (leges) are either divine or 
human. Divine laws are based on nature, human laws on customs. For this reason 
human laws may differ, because different laws suit different peoples. Fas is divine 
law; ius is human law.xv 
In this brief passage, Gratian attempts to cut through a Gordian knot of legal complications 
regarding the legitimacy of competing systems of law and the primacy of Church or canon 
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law, which is both consistent with other systems of law and takes priority over them in certain 
key cases of difference. What we commonly call ‘laws’ (leges), and what Gratian here 
qualifies as ‘human laws’, are merely custom recorded in writing. Divine law and natural law 
both correspond to ius. Gratian has in mind not only the conflict between Empire and Church, 
but also centuries of reflection by theologians and jurists on the relations between Christian 
and non-Christian laws. Augustine, among others, posited a succession of ages. First ‘before 
the law’ (from Adam to Moses) is the age in which humanity is ruled by ‘natural law’, as 
dictated by human reason. Under natural law humanity progressed and became ready to 
receive God’s law through Moses, marking the beginning of the second age (from Moses to 
Christ), ‘under the law’ (even though most of humanity, ignoring Mosaic law, still followed 
natural law). Finally, humanity progresses to the point where it is ready to receive redemption 
through Christ’s incarnation, which marks the beginning of the third and final age ‘under 
grace’. While Augustine (and after him 12th-century theologians such as Hugh of St Victor) 
emphasize the progression between the three laws, each more perfect than its predecessor, 
Gratian emphasizes the essential harmony between the three. While natural law, instituted at 
creation, is the oldest of the three, nothing in divine law contradicts it. What divine law 
contains beyond natural law are the mystica, mysteries or sacraments, which man could not 
have discovered by simple reason. For example, the duty of circumcision or the prohibition of 
pork; these are mystica contained in the Law of Moses. And the Christian Law of the Gospels 
contradicts neither natural nor Mosaic law: Christ himself affirmed that he came not to 
destroy the law but to fulfil it [Matt. 7:15]. Thus, for Gratian, when the Church replaced 
circumcision by baptism this was not a modification of the immutable divine law, but simply 
the spiritual observation of a law that had heretofore been interpreted literally. Divine law 
hence contains all of natural law; anything that goes against natural law is necessarily against 
divine law as well.  Instead of trying to exclude Justinian from divine law, he envelops and 
subordinates him: Roman law is useful and valid, but only in as much as it corresponds to the 
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principles of justice incarnated in natural law.  The authority of Roman law derives from its 
adherence with the principles of natural and divine law, not from its antiquity or its 
association with the Empire. 
For Gratian, and for canonists of the following centuries, these principles had important 
consequences for the legal status and legitimacy of non-Christians both within and outside of 
Christendom. The legitimacy of Mosaic law implied a role for Jews living within Christian 
society. In this, again, Gratian is very much in the continuity of traditions grounded in Roman 
law and theorized by Augustine (as noted above), among others. 
This vision of Judaism bowed and subservient pervades theological and legal texts of the 
period. Throughout Europe, communities of Jews lived in the cities (and in some areas in the 
countryside) and often played important roles in trade and, increasingly, in finance. Various 
European rulers issued laws guaranteeing safety and often some degree of legal autonomy to 
these Jewish communities. Pope Callixtus II (1119-1124) issued a bull Sicut Judaeis, which 
offered few specific protections to Jews living within Christian society. Callixtus’ letter does 
not survive, nor does that of his successor Eugenius III (1145-1153), but both are referred to 
by Pope Alexander III, who issued his own bull, Sicut Judaeis, sometime between 1159 and 
1181, in which he prohibits Christians from forcing Jews to convert or imposing penalties on 
those who do. He further bars Christians from injuring Jews or taking money from them, 
disrupting Jewish festivals, exacting additional services or desecrating Jewish cemeteries to 
extort money.xvi Later popes were to reissue this bull, sometimes with minor variations. 
Dozens of the legal texts compiled by Gratian in his Decretum provide concrete examples of 
the subordinate but protected role of assigned to Jews in Christian society. While the Church 
claimed no jurisdiction over Jews, it did attempt to regulate and limit Christian interaction 
with Jews, prohibiting Christians from sharing meals with Jews or having sexual intercourse 
with them—much less marry them.  Jews were not to own Christian slaves (a rule later 
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interpreted as a ban on the employment of Christian servants); they were not to exercise 
authority over Christians.xvii In the judicial landscape of medieval Europe, multiple systems of 
justice overlapped (and sometimes were in outright rivalry with each other): seigniorial 
courts, royal courts, municipal courts, ecclesiastical courts, and rabbinical courts (which 
treated disputes within the Jewish communities). In theory, Jews were prohibited from 
bearing witness against Christians or exercising any jurisdiction or authority over them: this 
principle is found in Roman law, in canon law and in many texts of civil law. Yet in fact, 
throughout Europe we find numerous laws that allow Jews to bear witness against Christians 
in disputes concerning them and that allow disputes between Jewish and Christian individuals 
to be judged by a mixed group of Christians and Jews. As in Rome and Byzantium, these 
restrictive laws are often reissued and reiterated, suggesting that they were enforced only 
sporadically. 
In Christian terms, this subservient place of Jews in society corresponds to the distinction of 
different laws in three ages: if in the first age, ante legem, the law of nations (lex gentium) 
was universal, it is superseded, but by no means nullified, by the revelation of the new law of 
Moses (lex Moysi). For jurists from Gratian to Grotius and beyond, natural law, seen as the 
source of lex gentium, remains the basis of political and legal legitimacy of non-Christian 
nations: from the 13th century onwards, jurists debated over when and to what extent 
Christian rulers could forcibly take power from non-Christians. While their responses vary, 
on the whole it was only the breaking of natural law (through human sacrifice, for example, 
or through persecuting Christians) that justified Christians taking over their lands.  We have 
seen that with the advent of the lex Christi, the lex Moysi is subsumed and perfected under the 
new law, yet Jews enjoy a precarious toleration for their continued respect of the lex Moysi.   
What about the Muslims (or ‘Saracens’, the term used by medieval authors, including jurists)? 
(Tolan, 2002) As gentes who had received neither the Mosaic revelation nor the Gospel, they 
were subject to natural law or lex gentium. Yet many Latin authors were aware that they had 
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their own scriptures or law, often referred to as the ‘law of the Saracens’ (lex Sarracenorum) 
or the ‘law of Muhammad’ (lex Mahumeti). While Latin Christians had a coherent vision of 
Judaism, where a legitimate but surpassed revelation granted them a tolerated but inferior role 
in Christian society, there was no coherence between Latin Christians’ theological vision of 
Islam and the role granted to Muslims living in Christian societies. Just as the term sharī‘a is 
used by contemporary Arab writers (Jews, Christians and Muslims) to mean at the same time 
‘scripture’, ‘law’ and ‘religion’, Latin writers use lex to refer to scripture (bible or Qur’ān) 
and to faith community (of Jews, Christians or Muslims). This use of the terms lex Mahumeti 
and lex Sarracenorum underlines the profound ambivalence of Latin authors towards Islam 
and the Qur’ān.  While polemicists attacked the Qur’ān and denounced Islam as heresy, they 
also begrudgingly granted it the status of law and scripture.xviii 
While theologians increasingly painted Islam as heresy, canon law granted Saracens a legal 
status similar to that of Jews, indeed often simply adding to existing laws concerning Jews the 
provision that the law applied also to ‘Saracens’ or ‘pagans’. For example, when in 1179 the 
Third Lateran Council reissued the prohibition of Jews having Christian servants, it was 
specified that the prohibition applied to ‘Jews and Saracens’.xix Subsequently, the decretal 
collections of canonists Bernard of Pavia (compiled between 1188 and 1192) and Johannes 
Gallensis (between 1210 and 1214) grouped together decretals concerning Jews and Saracens 
under one heading. (Friedberg, 882) The Fourth Lateran Council imposed distinctive dress on 
both Jews and Saracens and prohibited both from holding public office or exercising any 
position of authority over Christians. These principles were consistently reiterated in 
subsequent law texts, both ecclesiastical and secular—though they were frequently ignored in 
practice. 
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The legal revolution in Europe between the 11th and 13th centuries thus saw the affirmation 
of a number of fundamental principles which were to permeate European legal discourse in 
the following centuries and which are still central to Western notions concerning ‘law’ and 
‘religion’—including, of course, the methodological suppositions of many historians and 
anthropologists. For legal scholars as for theologians in this period, God established a rational 
order to his creation, an order which man, through his God-given gift of reason (and in spite 
of his imperfection) can strive to understand.  The harmony of the foundational texts and 
principles of law, like those of Christianity, were a matter of faith.  This unified theory of ius 
as an expression of God’s rational order of the universe evolved in a fragmented legal 
landscape, where diverse legal fora existed and competed (episcopal, seigniorial, papal, royal, 
municipal, rabbinical, ducal etc.). 
 
Like a tree whose growth rings testify to years of drought or flood, fire or cold, our 21st-
century notions of ‘religion’ and ‘law’ bear the marks of the struggles in which they were 
born and in which they evolved. The four periods examined here are crucial to the evolution 
of both concepts. It was in the 4th- and 5th-century Christian Roman Empire, that the concept 
of ‘religion’ as we know it emerged, first to define Christianity, then to qualify the rival 
‘religions’ of Hellenism and Judaism; and a key element in defining and delimiting these 
‘religions’ is found in laws, notably those of the Theodosian Code. Yet we also saw that law 
was far from monolithic, and that in the late Roman Empire (and even more so in the 
kingdoms that succeeded the Empire in the west), judicial pluralism was the rule, as 
individuals and groups negotiated between competing jurisdictions. We examined Arabic 
concepts of din, sharī’a, fiqh etc., and saw how closely linked notions of law and religion 
were  in early Muslim societies; we also saw how fiqh clearly defined the protected and 
subordinate status of Jews and Christians and granted them limited judicial autonomy. 
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Finally, we have seen how the 12th-century revolution in European legal studies 
fundamentally altered our notions of both law and religion. 
Historians, anthropologists, sociologists and others should thus keep in mind that the terms 
‘law’ and ‘religion’ are packed with strata of implications that have accumulated over the 
centuries: neither term translates easily into languages that were not shaped by these events. 
Anthropologists have of course long been aware of this and have struggled to define ‘religion’ 
or to propose alternate terms. (cf. Morris, 2006: 1–13; Obadia, 2007) But often the alternate 
terms are even more problematic: ‘faith’ or ‘belief’ for example, emphasize a phenomenon 
that is at the heart of the definition of Christianity or Islam, but is only part of it—and is not 
the defining or most salient feature  of other commonly-identified ‘religions’. And of course 
faith and belief are important to many aspects of our lives that we do not recognize as 
pertaining to the realm of the religious. ‘Cult’, ‘rite’ and other terms pose similar problems. 
The solution is perhaps not to find some euphemistic substitute for our loaded terms law and 
religion, but to bear in mind that these terms, like so many others we use, are far from 
universal, and that to understand them one has to comprehend how they have evolved over the 
centuries. 
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